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Abstract 
 
There is growing consensus on the view that corruption hurts economic performance by 
reducing private investment, by adversely affecting the quantity and quality of public 
infrastructure, by reducing tax revenue, and by reducing human capital accumulation. In 
addition to inefficiency effects – causing lower growth for a given endowment in factors 
and technology –, corruption also has adverse distributional effects as it hurts the poor 
disproportionately. For a given level of government budget and national income, high 
corruption countries achieve lower literacy rates, have higher mortality rates, and overall 
worse human development outcomes. Corruption deepens poverty by reducing pro-poor 
pubic expenditures, by creating artificial shortages and congestion in public services, and 
by inducing a policy bias in favor of capital intensity, which perpetuates unemployment. 
High levels of corruption in African countries constitute one of the factors explaining not 
only slow growth but also limited progress in poverty reduction. Eradicating corruption 
in African bureaucracies is a challenging task, especially because it is a systemic 
phenomenon that exhibits a strong tendency for hysterisis. Therefore, explicit strategies 
are necessary to change the incentive structure by modifying the payoffs and sanctions 
that govern the interactions between bureaucrats and private economic operators. 
Strategies to fight corruption include measures to increase transparency in the 
management of public resources, establishing an incentive structure that rewards honest 
behavior among civil servants, enforcing transparency in international contracts and 
equal penalties to all parties to corrupt deals, and promotion of a free and responsible 
media. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years, the need to accelerate growth and poverty alleviation in African 
economies has gained prominence in domestic and international policy circles.  
Investment in poverty alleviation has become the primary measuring stick for the 
commitment to economic development in national policy as well as in the development 
assistance community.  The emerging consensus is that while growth is necessary, it is 
not sufficient to overcome deep poverty.  The development community has committed to 
tackling the greatest challenge of the 21st century, which is “to provide every human 
being on the planet with a long, healthy, and fulfilling life, free of poverty.”*  This new 
focus on poverty alleviation is supported by broad-based advocacy initiatives and has 
generated promises for increased funding for development, including the recent 
commitment to debt cancellation by the major industrialized countries.  
 
However, the high expectations from the recent declarations of “making poverty history” 
have not yet materialized in African countries.  At the current pace, the chances for most 
African countries of achieving the millennium development goals are quite slim.  
According to the UNECA’s Economic Report of Africa 2005, sub-Saharan Africa is the 
only region where the poverty headcount (below one dollar per day) has steadily 
increased since 1980 (UNECA 2005).  In the 2005 Human Development Report, 30 of the 
32 countries classified in the “low human development” category are in sub-Saharan 
Africa (UNDP 2005).  Of the 38 severely indebted low income countries, 32 are in the 
sub-continent.  The majority of these same countries are spending less on education and 
health care than on external debt service despite the promises of debt relief and higher aid 
disbursement.  It is clear that without more resource inflows, sub-Saharan countries will 
not make much progress in addressing the problems of extreme poverty, endemic hunger, 
the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and unacceptably high death toll from preventable and curable 
diseases such as malaria, and tuberculosis. 
 
Even with increased external funding, however, progress in accelerating growth and 
fighting poverty will be limited unless substantial improvements are achieved in the 
efficiency of utilization of funds.  In the past, a large fraction of aid and borrowed funds 
flowing into many African countries has been squandered into wasteful projects that left 
the countries indebted with nothing to show for in terms of social development.  Another 
fraction of these funds has been embezzled and used to finance the accumulation of 
private assets abroad.  As ironic as it may sound, research has shown that Africa is a “net 
creditor” to the rest of the world in the sense that outflows of funds vastly exceed inflows 
and private assets held abroad exceed the continent’s liabilities to the rest of the world 
(Ndikumana and Boyce 2003; Boyce and Ndikumana 2001, 2005).  In the meantime 
domestic resources mobilization is hampered by institutionalized theft and bureaucratic 
inefficiencies, and the proceeds from natural resources in many African countries are 
                                                 
* Excerpt from the World Bank’s ad of its MiniAtlas of Millennium Development Goals: Building a Better 
World (July 2005), accessed online at http://publications.worldbank.org. 
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embezzled by politicians in connivance with their domestic as well as international 
cronies in the private sector. 
 
It is therefore evident that the efforts to mobilize development finance in order to 
stimulate growth and alleviate poverty must be complemented by equally vigorous efforts 
to fight corruption.  In the press release accompanying its 2005 report, Transparency 
International highlights the “double burden of poverty and corruption” that plagues less 
developed countries.  According to Transparency International, “corruption is a major 
cause of poverty as well as a barrier to overcoming it” (Transparency International 2005).  
Corruption exists in all bureaucracies and political systems around the world.  It is not a 
developing country problem; it is not an African problem.  However, corruption causes 
much more damage to the African people than to developed countries’ populations.  
While the continent hosts some of the most destitute households in the world, it also 
counts some of the wealthiest individuals on the planet.  Former Zairian dictator Mobutu 
once held assets abroad that exceeded his country’s external debt (Ndikumana and Boyce 
1998).  The former dictators of Nigeria amassed wealth in several billions of dollars by 
milking the country’s oil reserves in connivance with international oil corporations.  The 
anti-corruption commission in Kenya unmasked billions of dollars stashed abroad by 
former president Moi and his collaborators.†  Even when these sums of stolen money are 
uncovered, they are difficult to repatriate because of the complexity and complicity of 
western financial centers.   
 
The plunder of African resources is a double blow to African economies.  It bleeds the 
countries of their resources and also denies the African people the benefits that may 
accrue from investment of the stolen funds in the country.  It is sad and ironic that 
wealthy African dictators have to end their lives in clinics (or on the plane going to 
clinics) in Western countries.  If they had only used some of the stolen money to build 
modern private hospitals at home and equip them, and build private hotels and vacation 
resorts and roads that lead to these estates, at least these ventures would have generated 
some employment and their loots could have greased national financial systems, thus 
yielding positive externalities in the economy.  The debate on resource mobilization for 
development and poverty alleviation must therefore focus urgently on strategies for 
curbing and reversing the financial hemorrhage that corruption inflicts on African 
economies. 
 
The first step in designing strategies to prevent corruption is to understand the scope and 
vehicles of corruption.  This paper provides a review of the literature and discusses the 
main conclusions from the evidence from Africa and other developing regions.  The 
paper examines the mechanisms through which corruption arises and is perpetuated in the 
economy and discusses how corruption affects economic growth and undermines efforts 
to fight poverty.  Existing empirical evidence from the literature is examined and 
supplemented with results from statistical analysis based on cross-country data from 1990 
to 1999.  The choice of the sample period was constrained by availability of data on 
governance indicators.  The ultimate objective of the study is to contribute to the 
discussion of strategies that need to be envisaged in African countries in their drive to 
                                                 
† See Holmquist (2005) for a discussion of politics and corruption in post-Moi Kenya. 
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establish an institutional environment that allow to maximize the use of national 
resources and increase the marginal impact of economic growth on poverty alleviation. 
 
2. CORRUPTION: WHAT IS IT AND WHY DO WE CARE? 
 
Corruption as a rational self-perpetuating phenomenon 
 
Corruption is generally understood as the abuse of government office to extract rent in 
the provision of public services.  Corruption is the outcome of a systematic decay of state 
institutions.  In other words, “corruption is a symptom of something gone wrong in the 
management of the state” (UNDP 1997: xi).  Sociologists characterize the phenomenon 
of corruption as a symptom of a dysfunctional relationship between the state and the 
citizenry, which involves three important phenomena: bribery, extortion and nepotism 
(Alatas 1968: 11).  Corruption consists of the “subordination of public interests to private 
aims involving a violation of the norms of duty and welfare, accompanied by secrecy, 
betrayal, deception, and a callous disregard for any consequence suffered by the public” 
(Alatas 1968: 12).  Corruption erodes the norms of integrity, responsibility, and 
accountability and it institutionalizes impunity. 
 
Corruption is both systemic and deliberate.  As Charap and Harm (2002: 137) put it, 
corruption is “the natural result of efficient predatory behavior in a lawless world.” While 
corruption may be harmful to society as a whole, it is beneficial to the individuals who 
perpetrate it.  Therefore, corruption is not a behavioral pathology.  Corrupt bureaucrats 
find it privately more beneficial to use government regulation and to manipulate the law 
to create corruption opportunities or economic rent rather than earn an honest wage by 
providing services as required by the law.  Thus corruption is the outcome of a calculated 
move by bureaucrats to maximize their own material wellbeing to the detriment of 
society as a whole.  Moreover, corruption tends to be contagious because of 
institutionalized impunity and greed on the part of bureaucrats.  Once corruption sets in 
one sector of the government system, it tends to spread into the other spheres of public 
service and eventually becomes systemic.  Once corruption becomes systemic, it 
becomes expected by both the bureaucrats and ordinary citizens, which creates a vicious 
circle whereby corruption creates expectations of corruption that generate demand and 
supply for bribes, extortion and nepotism.   
 
Corruption is thus endogenous in the sense that it is the outcome of deliberate decisions 
by agents that manipulate and exploit the institutional environment to maximize their 
gains, which may be material or non-material.  It is the manipulation of the institutional 
environment that creates the “lawless world” that allows corruption to take place and also 
perpetuates impunity.  Therefore, “lawlessness” is deliberate and beneficial to the corrupt 
bureaucrats.  Because of the benefits that corruption brings to its beneficiaries, and 
because of the ability of the latter to manipulate the institutional environment to make 
corruption possible, corruption then becomes a self-perpetuating phenomenon.  Once a 
system is corrupt it is likely to become more corrupt unless explicit and systematic efforts 
are undertaken to eradicate the phenomenon. 
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Corruption, the individual, and the state 
 
In one of his Business Week columns, Nobel Prize winning economist Gary Becker once 
claimed that abolishing the state would get rid of corruption (Tanzi 2002).  In this sense, 
Becker assigns the guilt of corruption to the state rather than the individual.  French 
writer and philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau argued that “it is not the corruption of man 
which destroys the political system but the political system which corrupts and destroys 
man” (Heidenheimer, Johnston, and LeVine 1989: 19).  Taken literally, the Beckerian 
view is problematic on two fronts.  First, not all states are corrupt and the level of 
corruption varies over time within a given country.  The more useful question is what 
factors make some states more corrupt than others and what factors cause corruption to 
increase (or decrease) within a particular country over time. 
 
Secondly, Becker’s proposition is simply not practical.  While countries can’t do much 
with corrupt governments, no country can do without a government either.  The 
functioning of a modern economy requires state regulation that sets and enforces the rules 
of exchange.  Efficient institutions are the key factor of economic performance and social 
stability over time (North 1990).  The issue then is how to establish and enforce the 
appropriate mechanisms that make the state efficient at promoting economic exchange.  
The fact of the matter is that we have no substitute for the state.  The proven inability of 
markets to “do it all” is the very basic reason for the existence of the state. 
 
The Beckerian association of corruption with the state is the result of a conflation of two 
different phenomena, namely the existence of the state and the control of power within 
the state.  It is not the existence of the state per se that generates corruption but it is the 
concentration of power within the state that makes corruption possible.  Lord Actor’s 
dictum has it that “all power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely” 
(Heidenheimer, Johnston, and LeVine 1989: 16).  Lack of checks and balances generates 
corruption by allowing individuals in power to manipulate the law to create opportunities 
for bribes, extortion and patronage.  Moreover, monopolization of power allows corrupt 
acts to remain unpunished, especially due to lack of independence of the judiciary.  
Indeed historical evidence confirms Friedrich’s law, which predicts that the degree of 
corruption varies inversely to the degree that power is consensual (Friedrich 1989).   
 
Every political system has been corrupt at some point in history.  In the 1700s, Britain 
was viewed by American colonists as very corrupt (Heidenheimer, Johnston, and LeVine 
1989: 4).  Over time, consolidation of the democratic process and the strengthening of 
checks and balances that accompanies it led to a reduction in systemic corruption.  The 
main lesson from this historical evidence is that it is possible for any country to reduce 
corruption to levels that are relatively harmless to economic exchange.  Moreover, the 
evidence implies that corruption is not specific to any country or region of the world.  
The key to minimizing corruption is the ability of a country to engineer a balanced 
distribution of power and adequate checks and balances within the state. 
 
Why the recent focus on corruption? 
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Corruption is by no means new in human society.  Corrupt behavior was considered a sin 
in most civilizations as illustrated in books, work of art, and oral tradition.  In the 
American Constitution, corruption was explicitly mentioned as one of the crimes that 
could justify impeachment of the President (Tanzi 2002).     
 
Just as corruption is not a new phenomenon, efforts to eradicate it and prevent it are not 
new either.  Constitutions at all times have included rules that prohibit abuse of 
bureaucratic power for private gains and to prevent conflict of interest in the exercise of 
public service.  Legal systems include provisions for prosecution of acts of corruption by 
public officials.  However, these legal dispositions have not prevented corruption from 
running rampant in many countries.  Recently attention on corruption has increased 
substantially both within countries and in the international community.  Several factors 
explain this increased focus on corruption especially in less developed countries (see 
Tanzi 2002).  We highlight the main factors here. 
 
The first reason for the increased attention to corruption and the drumming up of the 
rhetoric on fighting corruption is the end of the Cold War and the changes in international 
geopolitics that have accompanied it.  During the Cold War, evidence of endemic 
corruption in developing countries was overlooked for political reasons.  Donors and 
individual governments in the West were willing to tolerate corruption and even 
indirectly finance corruption among client states to advance strategic interests.  A vivid 
example of this practice of turning a blind eye to corruption is the case of the Mobutu 
regime in former Zaïre.  Mobutu was regarded as a key instrument in the fight against the 
expansion of Soviet influence in Africa.  For this reason, Mobutu obtained generous 
financial and military support from Belgium, France and the United States.  Evidence of 
corruption and embezzlement of borrowed funds and natural resources did not deter 
official support to the regime (Ndikumana and Boyce 1998).  A report compiled by Mr. 
Erwin Blumenthal, a World Bank envoy in the country, produced ample evidence of 
irregularities and misappropriation in the management of government funds and natural 
resources to the benefit of the president and his entourage (Dungia 1982).  The report 
clearly stated that Mobutu did not care about repayment of public debts, but that he 
counted on the “generosity” of his creditors for indefinite renewal of loan agreements.  
Mobutu was too important an ally in Cold War politics for the West to risk alienating him 
with demands for financial integrity.  Today, such cold war political considerations have 
ended and this may explain the stronger insistence by the West on eradicating corruption 
in Africa and other developing regions.   
 
The second factor that explains the increased focus on corruption is the rise in 
democratization and freedom of the press, which has provided the political space for the 
public to scrutinize corruption and demand more accountability on the part of 
governments.  The rise in civil society activity has contributed to bringing the issue of 
corruption to higher levels in national and international policy debates. 
 
The third important factor is the pressure for economic reforms and the new evidence on 
the role of governance for economic performance (Hillman 2004).  The fight against 
corruption is often included in development assistance conditionalities.  This focus on 
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corruption is a result of the belated realization that aid poured in the hands of corrupt 
leaders is not only economically wasteful but can also be politically destabilizing.  Indeed 
aid to corrupt regimes contributes to instability as it tilts the balance of power further in 
favor of the incumbent regime, to the detriment of the forces of social change.   
 
The attention to corruption has also been increased by pressure from NGOs and various 
advocacy groups that are concerned about its effects on human rights.  Corrupt regimes 
tend to also be the worst abusers of human rights, partly as a means of suppressing 
demand for accountability and economic justice.  A related motivation for the pressure 
for the eradication of corruption is global security.  Corrupt regimes are more likely to 
succumb to pressure from terrorist groups or may simply be so weak that they are not 
able to contribute to the efforts to promote security around the world. 
 
This increased focus on corruption has transpired in the media, academic research, and 
even legislation in the West as well as in the Third World.  In its December 1995 issue, 
Financial Times characterized 1995 as the year of corruption.  Policy makers and 
researchers have been brought to the realization that it is impossible to improve economic 
performance and raise the living standards of the poor without tackling the issue of 
corruption.  The World Bank and the IMF have invested in research on corruption.  The 
effort has been echoed in academia, taking advantage of the increased availability of 
information on measures of corruption from watchdog institutions such as Transparency 
International.  Governments and international bodies responded by establishing new anti-
corruption institutions and voting agreements and treaties to fight corruption in 
international business practice.  For example, the United Nations adopted the Action 
Against Corruption in December 1996, which includes an international code of conduct 
for public officials. 
 
Nonetheless, despite this increased focus on corruption, it remains one of the biggest 
challenges faced by governments and the international development assistance 
community.  There is evidence on the devastating effects of corruption on the economy, 
the political system, and society as a whole.  To overcome corruption, it is essential to 
understand its causes and vehicles in order to design the appropriate policy responses.  
The next section discusses the various vehicles of corruption as identified in the 
literature. 
 
3. CAUSES AND VEHICLES OF CORRUPTION 
 
Theoretical research on the causes and vehicles of corruption draws from the work of 
Bhagwati (1974), Krueger (1974), and Rose-Ackerman (1978), among others.  This 
strand of literature characterizes corruption as the outcome of some form of government 
regulation that creates opportunities for rent.  Because the government has monopoly in 
the provision of services, the private actor is a captive victim of the rent-seeking 
bureaucrat.  In a corrupt bureaucracy, the private actor must pay bribes to “get business 
done.”  If private businesses expect corruption, then they internalize it by passing the cost 
of bribes onto the consumer through price surcharges.  Ultimately, corruption generates a 
Pareto inferior outcome by making society as a whole absolutely worse off.   
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The literature has identified several factors that are associated with corruption.  While 
definitive causal linkages are difficult to establish, the evidence suggests that wherever 
these factors exist, corruption will prevail.  These factors include discretion in public 
spending, the structure of the tax system, low relative wages in the public sector, 
embezzlement of external borrowing and aid, and lack of transparency in international 
contracts in natural resource extraction.  This section discusses how these factors relate to 
corruption. 
 
(1) Discretion, distortion, and government spending as a vehicle of corruption 
 
Corruption is by and large a byproduct of government intervention (Acemoglu and 
Verdier 2000).  Most cases of corruption involve extraction of bribes and kickbacks in 
relation to expenditures on government projects and services.  This kind of corruption is 
made possible by the discretion that the policy maker enjoys in determining the type, 
size, composition, and geographical location of projects and service delivery points.  
Corruption is associated with market imperfections and illegality or secrecy.  It is the 
secret and illegal use of monopoly status associated with regulation of economic 
exchange that generates corruption.   
 
The level of discretion varies across types of government services or sectors.  For 
example, the government has more discretion on capital expenditures than recurrent 
expenditures (Mauro 1998).  While a government official can manipulate expenditures on 
a road construction project in order to extract kickbacks, it is more difficult to embezzle 
civil servant salaries.  The bureaucrat will allocate the road project to the construction 
company that promises the highest kickbacks.  Roads are often located not in regions 
with the highest economic potentials but in the native regions of influential political 
figures.  Such rent-seeking practices and politically motivated decisions create 
inefficiencies and inequality in the allocation of public infrastructure.  Inequality in 
resource distribution in turn perpetuates corruption as it undermines the ability of the 
disadvantaged regions or groups to challenge rent-seeking and discriminatory practices.  
At the same time, private actors that benefit from corruption in the bureaucracy (e.g., 
those that are granted monopoly rights in commerce and industry) provide support to the 
regime against political pressure for change.   
 
There is ample evidence for this vicious circle of discretion, monopoly, and endemic 
corruption.  In a study of the political economy of conflict in Burundi, Ngaruko and 
Nkurunziza (2000) show that the allocation of public infrastructure was solely motivated 
by political interests and how corruption and patronage generated a skewed distribution 
of resources in favor of the southern region that controlled power since independence.  
By concentrating education infrastructure in the south, the ruling elite were able to 
perpetuate their grip on power by suffocating intellectual advancement in the rest of the 
country.  Through patronage and nepotism, the control of the entire economic system 
remained also in the hands of the southern elite.  Political interests dictated the allocation 
of public infrastructure as well.  For example, the more politically influential southern 
regions of Bututsi and Mugamba saw modern roads before the regions in the East, North, 
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and Northwest of the country although the latter have much higher potential for 
agricultural production and trade.  The case of Burundi shows that corruption and 
nepotism not only have detrimental economic effects but they are also politically 
destabilizing.‡
 
(2) The tax system as a vehicle of corruption 
 
A number of characteristics of the tax systems in less developed countries make them 
prone to corruption.  First the tax systems tend to be complex, which makes it difficult for 
taxpayers to know exactly their tax liabilities and their rights.  Tax collectors can 
overstate or threaten to overstate tax liabilities to extract bribes.  The rational response for 
the taxpayer is to bribe the tax collector to reduce the effective tax burden.  Such an 
arrangement enriches the tax collector, alleviates the current tax burden on the private 
actors, but robs the government and society of valuable resources. 
 
The second feature of the tax system that provides opportunities for corruption is the 
discretionary power of the fiscal authority to grant tax exemptions, tax cuts, and other 
privileges.  This discretionary power is often used to advance sectarian interests, 
including those of ethnic and regional interest groups.  Efforts to improve efficiency in 
tax collection often are hampered by the resistance from the fiscal authority that is 
reluctant to relinquish this discretionary power over tax administration.  For example, in 
the case of Uganda, moves to grant autonomy to the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA, 
created in 1991) created frictions between the URA and the customary authority, namely 
the Ministry of Finance, partly because autonomy of the URA meant a weakening of the 
power of the Minister of Finance over tax administration (see Ndikumana and Nanyonjo 
2005; Therkildsen 2004).   
 
Another feature of the tax system that increases the propensity for corruption is excessive 
centralization.  In addition to inefficiencies due to delays in tax administration, 
centralization also increases the discretionary power of the central authority, which leads 
to higher corruption. 
 
Corruption in the tax system perpetuates the tendency for evasion on the part of taxpayers 
while establishing a culture of impunity among tax collectors.  Corruption also causes an 
uneven spread of the tax burden.  Wealthy and politically connected individuals find 
ways to minimize their tax burden while the poor and disenfranchised taxpayers bear the 
full tax incidence.  In the business sector, evidence tends to show that large firms are able 
to use their leverage to evade taxation while small enterprises benefit from informality to 
also evade taxation.  The burden of taxation therefore falls disproportionately on the 
medium sized enterprises (Gauthier and Reinikka 2001), which also happen to be the 
most dynamic segment of the private sector in developing countries.  Therefore, 
corruption in the tax system imposes severe constraints on the development of the 
business sector. 
 
                                                 
‡ Also see Ndikumana (2005) for a discussion of predation and unequal distribution of resources as a source 
of instability in Burundi. 
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(3) Debt and external collusion with kleptocracy  
 
One vehicle of corruption that has been relatively less emphasized in the literature on 
corruption is the looting of external debt and aid by government leaders.  Aid and 
external debt are subject to corruption in many ways.  First, government officials who are 
responsible for debt management simply embezzle the funds.  Second, government 
officials extract kickbacks on projects financed by debt.  Third, due to fungibility of 
aid/debt and imperfect monitoring by donors and lenders, inflows of external finance 
allow government officials to embezzle domestic funds while maintaining a “normal” 
level of activity in the public sector.  In this sense, rather than financing corruption 
directly, external finance indirectly facilitates corruption.  The fourth and very important 
route by which external finance is associated with corruption is through capital flight.  A 
large faction of the borrowed funds ends up in bank accounts and other assets held abroad 
by private individuals.  In many instances, in a phenomenon referred to as “round 
tripping”, part of the loans do not even leave Western banks as the funds are simply 
credited to private accounts on behalf of government officials (Boyce 1992).   
 
Capital flight involves shared responsibility of corrupt government leaders in developing 
countries and Western lenders.  In many cases, lenders continue to pour money in the 
hands of corrupt leaders even when there is ample evidence that the money is being 
embezzled and that there is little prospect for repayment of the loans.  Such lending 
occurs either because of strategic reasons in the case of official lending or because of 
immunity from default due to generous public guarantees in the case of private loans.  A 
blatant example of complacent lending to a corrupt regime is the case of former Zaïre 
under president Mobutu who ruled the country from 1965 to 1997 (Ndikumana and 
Boyce 1998).  By the end of the 1980s, it was clear that Mobutu’s regime was in serious 
difficulties financially and that its solvency was severely threatened.  While private 
financiers began to pull out, official lenders continued to support the client regime.  The 
West could not abandon its client; cold war politics obliges.  A private banker observed 
the following: “Mobutu was untouchable in client terms – I couldn’t think of exposing 
another penny to him.  The country was virtually bankrupt and massive inflows of 
foreign exchange were clearly being siphoned off… In that context if there were any 
bankers still willing to lend money, there are some serious questions to be asked about 
them” (Ndikumana and Boyce 1998: 209).  Corruption, generously funded by the West, 
contributed to the decay of ethics in the management of public funds.  This made 
corruption a self-perpetuating phenomenon. 
 
The externally sponsored corruption in former Zaïre under Mobutu is also a vivid 
illustration of the asymmetry of the impact of corruption.  While the people of Zaïre were 
left crumbling under the weight of over $14bn in external debt, the Western financiers 
got away with murder and profited from their irresponsible lending.  It is clear that both 
Mobutu and his financiers share the responsibility for the stolen wealth.  The case of 
former Zaïre under Mobutu exemplifies the situation in many other countries in Africa 
and in other regions of the developing world (Ndikumana and Boyce 2003; Boyce and 
Ndikumana 2001; Boyce 1992).  From 1970 to 1996, capital flight from 30 sub-Saharan 
African countries amounted to $187 billion, exceeding their debt obligations by $84.9 
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billion (Ndikumana and Boyce 2003).  The majority of these countries spend less on 
health and education than on debt service and are also plagued by high levels of 
corruption (Table 1).  Financial hemorrhage compromises the efforts of promoting 
growth and fighting poverty.  Debates over corruption must pay serious attention to the 
problem of capital flight from African countries and other developing regions. 
 
(4) Public sector wages, incentive structure, and corruption 
 
It is often argued that bureaucratic corruption in less developing countries is due to low 
wages in the public sector.  Civil service wages are regarded as lower compared to 
private sector wages for comparable qualification and experience.  Therefore bureaucrats 
commercialize government services and embezzle public funds to make up for the 
disadvantage in the pay rate.  Moreover, controlling for qualification and productivity, 
compensation packages tend to be skewed in favor of the top echelons of the 
bureaucracy, which forces the rank and file civil servants to use corruption to compensate 
for the gap.   
 
Two theoretical arguments have been used to motivate the connection between corruption 
and civil service wages: the efficiency wage argument and the fair wage argument§ 
(Hillman 2004; van Rijkeghem and Weder 2001).  According to the efficiency wage 
argument, given that monitoring of the behavior of civil servants is imperfect, high wages 
are needed to deter corruption.  A higher wage implies a higher cost of being caught in a 
corrupt undertaking and losing the job.  Thus, low relative wages in civil service reduce 
the cost of corruption.  In other words, at low wages the expected benefits from extortion, 
embezzlement, and bribery exceed the gains from honest behavior. 
 
According to the fair wage argument, civil servants engage in corruption to compensate 
for the differential between their compensation package and that of the higher ranked 
colleagues or those employed in juicier positions such as parastatals.  Here again, 
imperfect monitoring is what permits corruption to take place.  The top officials are better 
compensated but they do not have access to a technology for monitoring the rank and file 
civil servants perfectly. 
 
There is an obvious factual flaw with the fair wage argument.  In practice, there is no 
bureaucracy where the rank and file civil servants are corrupt while the top officials are 
honest.  More often than not, the top ranked officials are the most corrupt and their 
corrupt acts are more damaging to the welfare of society and the quality of institutions.  
Nonetheless, there is a legitimate case for reducing the unfairness of the wage distribution 
within the bureaucracy.  This will not only increase worker morale but also reduce the 
incentives to struggle for the capture of government positions.  Fair wages not only 
reduce inequality but they also raise productivity and lower the risk of social instability. 
 
It can also be argued that corruption is due to low absolute wages.  Civil servants may 
engage in corruption because their wages do not cover the minimum level of 
                                                 
§ The fair wage argument for the relationship between civil service wage and corruption is related to the 
Akerlof-Yellen fair wage effort hypothesis of unemployment (Akerlof and Yellen 1990). 
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consumption.  This would be interpreted as need-induced corruption, indicated by 
C_need on Figure 1.  At wages below the living wage WL, bureaucrats extract need-
induced corruption. The lower the wages, the higher the level of corruption.  Corruption 
that occurs at wages above the living wage is due to greed.  The argument is similar to 
the one advanced by Becker and Stigler (1974) who suggested that paying bureaucrats a 
wage above a certain “opportunity wage” encourages honest behavior.  Moreover, good 
wages in the private sector prevents the flight of skills from the public sector to the 
private sector.  Figure 1 also suggests that greed-induced corruption cannot be completely 
eliminated by raising wages.   
 
C
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)  
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Figure 1: Public sector wages and corruption: need vs. 
greed-induced corruption 
WL
Wage (W) 
 
 
One explanation given in the literature to motivate the link between low absolute wage 
and corruption appeals to morality.  The argument is that “people in need are more likely 
to abandon their moral principles” (Mauro 1998: 4).  This argument is fundamentally 
flawed and is not supported by evidence.  Corruption is orchestrated not by the neediest 
members of society but usually by the wealthiest.  In fact the neediest are the victims 
rather than the perpetrators of corruption.  Moreover, it is wrong to associate moral 
principles with wealth.  From biblical ages, material wealth has always been associated 
with poor moral principles (such as greed and social insensitivity) rather than moral 
virtue.   
 
The relationship in Figure 1 suggests a monotonic link between public sector wages and 
corruption.  However, higher wages may increase corruption by giving the bureaucrat 
more bargaining power in extracting rent.  Moreover, given that higher wages also raise 
the cost of being caught, once the bureaucrat succumbs to temptation, he/she will raise 
the asking price for engaging in a corrupt deal (Mookherjee and Png, 1995).  The 
corruption curve becomes upward sloping above the “temptation wage” as in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2: Public sector wages and corruption with imperfect 
monitoring and enforcement 
  
 
 
Given that monitoring is imperfect, even bureaucrats that are well paid may succumb to 
) Lack of transparency, natural resource extraction and international corruption 
stead of contributing to economic development, revenues from natural resources are 
 1995 the government’s chief executive for the Lesotho Highlands Water Project was 
prison for corruption, the British corporations got away with it.  This example illustrates 
temptation if presented with large amounts of payments.  Morality is made, not born.  
The implication is that in addition to higher wages, it is necessary to invest in monitoring 
and to enforce penalties in order to deter corruption. 
 
(5
 
In
often embezzled by government leaders in connivance with multinational corporations.  
A fraction of the receipts from these resources ends up in private off-shore accounts 
belonging to government officials.  Highly incriminating reports have been published by 
international watchdogs such as Transparency International and Global Witness that 
document large sums of money that are left unaccounted for in resource rich countries.  
In one of its reports, Global Witness characterized corruption in Angola as a human 
drama (La Moustique, 9 November 2005).  Since 1996, more than a billion of dollars of 
oil revenues have disappeared.  At the same time, one out of four Angolan children dies 
before the age of five as a result of insufficient nutrition and health care. Similar cases of 
embezzlement are frequently identified in other oil rich African countries such as the 
Republic of Congo and Equatorial Guinea (La Moustique, op cit). 
 
In
prosecuted and found guilty for receiving up to two million pound in bribes from 
multinational companies involved in the project.  Some of these companies included 
British corporations that had received up to 66 million pound of loan guarantees from the 
Export Credits Guarantee Department of the British government (New Statesman, 16 
September 2002).  Whereas the Lesotho government official was sentenced to 18 years in 
C
or
ru
pt
io
n 
(C
)
C(W) 
Wage (W) 
“Temptation wage’ 
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the tragedy of corruption in the natural resource industry in African countries.  External 
partners to corrupt deals enjoy both financial and political protection, which shields them 
from accountability in illicit business practices.  Even when efforts are undertaken to 
prosecute corruption, the process is unequal and asymmetric whereby the rigor of the law 
applies to the African counterpart while exonerating the external partners.  Western 
countries have laws on the books against corruption by their multinational companies, but 
such laws are poorly enforced when financial crime takes place in developing countries.  
Corruption in natural resource extraction is a shared responsibility between bureaucrats in 
developing countries and international companies, and it is perpetuated partly because of 
the complacent attitude of Western governments that are unwilling to enforce their own 
laws against corruption. 
 
4. CORRUPTION AND PRO-POOR GROWTH 
 
tion is a constraint to economic 
erformance (Tanzi 2002; Svensson 2005; Gyimah-Brempong 2002).  Cross-country 
 suggestive of an overall negative 
lationship between corruption and economic growth, although the relationship is less 
 
4.1. Corruption and growth: channels of causation
 
There is growing consensus on the view that corrup
p
evidence shows that countries with low income are also plagued with high levels of 
corruption, which in turn prevents these countries from growing fast and reaching higher 
levels of living standards.  However, as Figure 3 indicates, the relationship between 
corruption and income is complex.  Countries with similar levels of corruption may have 
vastly different levels of income.  Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates have similar 
corruption indexes (4.46 and 4.5, respectively), but per capita income in the Emirates 
($24557) is 264 times that of Ethiopia ($93).  Similarly, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo has a much higher level of corruption than Mozambique although the two 
countries have a similar level of per capita income.   
 
As can be seen in Figure 4, cross-country data is
re
pronounced than that between income and corruption.  However, this relationship also 
appears to be complex as countries with similar levels of corruption achieve different 
levels of growth.  Nonetheless, empirical evidence in the literature supports the notion 
that amelioration of corruption has a quantitatively large effect on growth.  For example, 
Mauro (1995) finds that a reduction in the corruption index by one standard deviation 
raises the growth rate of GDP per capita by 0.8 percentage points per annum.  The author 
finds that an improvement of the corruption index from 6 to 8 (on a scale of 1 to 10 
where 10 indicates the lowest corruption) raises growth by 0.5 percentage points (see 
Mauro 1998).  Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) find that a decline in the corruption index 
by one standard deviation raises growth by 0.20 percentage points.  Gyimah-Brempong 
(2002) finds similar results for a sample of 21 African countries for the period 1993-99. 
A unit increase in the corruption score is associated with a reduction in growth by 
between 0.7 and 0.9 percentage points.  These results suggest that the potential dividends 
from improvement in the governance are large. 
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To corroborate these findings we examine cross-country data for the period from 1980 to 
able 3 reports OLS regression results obtained from estimation of a simple model where 
1999 using simple correlation and OLS regression analysis.  Table 2 reports the 
coefficients of correlation between economic performance indicators and governance 
indexes.  One striking fact from the data is that compared to other developing regions, 
Sub-Saharan Africa has worse governance indicators and worse economic performance 
indicators (Table A1 in the appendix).**  The results in Tables 2 show a very high 
association of per capita income and corruption as well as other indicators of governance.  
The correlation coefficients in Table 2 range from 69 to 81 percent and are highly 
statistically significant.  The growth rate of per capita GDP is also negatively correlated 
with corruption and other governance indicators although the correlation is not as high as 
that of per capita income (from 0.31 to 0.45).   
 
T
the indicator of economic performance is regressed alternatively on the various 
governance indicators and a control variable.  For GDP growth, the regression includes 
domestic investment as a control variable.  For regressions with the other indicators, the 
control factors included in the equation are the growth rate of per capita GDP and life 
expectancy.  However, for child mortality rate, only GDP growth is included in the 
regression due to collinearity between child mortality and life expectancy.  Only the 
coefficient on the governance indicator and the associated coefficients of elasticity are 
reported in Table 3.  As can be seen in the first row of the Table, the results show a strong 
negative effect of corruption and other governance indicators on income and economic 
growth.   
 
Figure 3: Corruption and (log of) per capita GDP (n=120)
ln(gdp) = -0.82corruption + 10.69
R2 = 0.42
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** Details on the governance and economic performance indicators used in the analysis may be obtained 
from the author. 
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Figure 4: Corruption and per capita GDP growth, 
1984-1999 (n=120)
growth = -0.73 corruption + 3.66
R2 = 0.09
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he question arising from this evidence is how exactly corruption affects growth.  In this 
) Corruption retards economic growth by reducing private investment 
rivate investment has been demonstrated to be a key factor for long-term economic 
he magnitude of the effects of corruption on investment is quite large.  Pellegrini and 
T
section we discuss the various channels that have been identified in the literature with an 
emphasis on the following: private investment, public infrastructure, tax revenue, human 
capital accumulation and productivity, and political instability.   
 
(1
 
P
growth.  If corruption discourages private investment, it will retard growth.  Corruption 
discourages investment – both domestic and foreign investment – because bribes, 
kickbacks, and other forms of illicit payments increase uncertainty and the cost of 
production and reduce profitability (Mauro 1995; Tanzi and Davoodi 2002a).  Corruption 
acts as a special tax on businesses because unlike the official tax, it is secret and 
uncertain.  The corruption tax is uncertain partly because agreements between the 
investor and the bureaucrat are not enforceable.  If the bureaucrat defects to the 
agreement, the private investor cannot appeal to the law since he/she also broke the law 
by engaging in a corrupt deal.  Thus the corruption tax cannot be internalized, which 
undermines the investment climate. 
 
T
Gerlagh (2004) find that a one standard deviation decrease in the corruption index raises 
private investment by as much as 2.46 percentage points.  This increase in private 
investment in turn raises GDP growth by about  0.34 percentage points, which 
compounds the direct effect of the decline in corruption on growth.  In Mauro’s sample, 
investment rises by 2.9 percent following a decline in corruption by one standard 
deviation (Mauro 1995).  The improvement in corruption has large indirect effects, 
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notably through the accelerator effect whereby higher growth of income stimulates 
private investment.  Through the investment channel, a reduction in corruption therefore 
generates an investment-growth virtuous circle that launches the country on a faster 
growth path. Indeed, Mauro (1998) concludes that the largest effect of corruption on 
growth operates through its negative effect on private investment, accounting for about 
one third of the overall negative effect.  The empirical evidence suggests that the long-
term effects of corruption are large as corruption depresses capital accumulation, 
implying that endemic corruption is likely to keep countries stuck in low-growth 
equilibria. 
 
(2) Corruption reduces growth through its effects on the quantity and quality of public 
orruption has adverse effects on growth through its impact on public investment.  
orruption also affects the quality of public infrastructure by inducing decision makers to 
he data exhibits a high negative correlation between corruption and social expenditures, 
disadvantage of social services. 
                                                
investment 
 
C
Corruption affects the quality of public investment by encouraging the choice of public 
investment on the basis of expected private gains for decision makers rather than the 
benefits for society.  Indeed quite often, governments end up building “roads that go 
nowhere” (Driscol 1998), simply because they generate kickbacks or because they serve 
decision makers’ political interests.  
 
C
give priority to new projects to the detriment of maintenance of existing infrastructure, 
partly because new projects generate higher kickbacks (Mauro 1998; Tanzi and Davoodi 
2002b).  This bias in favor of new projects is also encouraged by the old “golden rule” 
that requires government to finance recurrent/maintenance expenditures by current 
revenue whereas capital expenditure can be financed by borrowing.  In the end, 
corruption may lead to higher, not lower public infrastructure, due to these rent-seeking 
and golden-rule incentives (Tanzi and Davoodi 2002b).  Indeed as can be seen in Figure 5 
and Tables 2 and 3, cross-country data shows that higher corruption is associated with 
higher capital expenditures.   However, note also that some countries with high 
corruption also have very low levels of capital expenditures.  The key point is that 
corruption hurts the economy by undermining the quality of public infrastructure due to 
rent-seeking by bureaucrats.  While endemic corruption may be consistent with high 
levels of public investment, growth will be retarded by the poor quality of public 
infrastructure.††   
 
T
especially public health (with a correlation coefficient of over 60 percent).  Measures of 
social wellbeing – under-5 child mortality and life expectancy – are negatively correlated 
with corruption while inequality is positively correlated with corruption.  The data clearly 
demonstrates the double bias in expenditure allocation: in favor of capital expenditure 
relative to maintenance expenditures, and in favor of capital expenditures to the 
 
†† Devarajan, Easterly and Pack (2003) argue that public investment in Sub-Saharan Africa is too high.  
Their point is similar to the one being raised here, that resources may be inefficiently allocated into 
unproductive public infrastructure, reducing the effects of investment on growth. 
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 Figure 5: Corruption and capital expenditures 
(n = 90 countries)
cap expenditure = 0.71corruption + 1.76
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(3) Corruption retards growth by reducing tax revenue 
enue (Shleifer and Vishny 1993).  
his relationship comes out clearly in cross-section data as illustrated in Figure 6 and 
g 39 sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1985-1996, Ghura 
998) finds that corruption is one of the strongest predictors of tax revenue, along with 
 
Corruption retards growth by adversely affecting tax rev
T
Tables 2 and 3.  Corruption reduces the tax base by disrupting trade and investment and 
through leakages due to tax evasion by tax payers and embezzlement by tax collectors.  
As tax revenue dwindles, funding for public infrastructure will be constrained, which 
retards growth.   
 
In a study coverin
(1
openness and endowment in oil.  This implies that measures taken to reduce corruption 
are likely to enhance tax revenue significantly. 
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Figure 6: Corruption and tax revenue  (n = 90 countries)
Tax revenue = - 4.21corruption + 35.55
R2 = 0.34
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(4) Corruption slows down growth through its effects on human capital 
 
Corruption diverts skills into unproductive activities, which adversely affects overall 
productivity in the public sector.  Bureaucrats spend valuable time chasing bribes, 
kickbacks and other forms of illicit bonuses rather than delivering services and 
implementing government regulations.  Corruption also distorts decision making with 
regard to education by inducing individuals to choose the professions that generate 
opportunities for rent seeking rather than those that are most appropriate to individual 
skills or the needs of society.  As a result, productivity of human capital is compromised. 
 
Moreover, corruption depresses human capital formation by undermining efficiency in 
education funding.  Due to a combination of inefficiencies and corruption, the education 
budget is often squandered and only a fraction is effectively spent on education 
infrastructure and supplies.  For example, in Uganda, a tracking study on education found 
that in 1996, only 36 percent of the contributions from the central government reached 
schools (World Bank 2002).  Therefore, corruption prevents the country from achieving 
its potential of human capital formation and therefore reduces economic performance. 
 
(5) Corruption retards growth by increasing the risk of political instability 
 
Corruption also retards growth by increasing the risk of political and social instability.  
While the elite fight for the control of power to maximize opportunities for rent-seeking, 
the citizenry becomes further disenfranchised.  The intra-elite struggle can contaminate 
the general social climate as the elite form coalitions and mobilize political support from 
the population.  The population’s discontent can be exploited by elites seeking to advance 
their goals behind a rhetoric of fighting for the interests of the disenfranchised citizenry.  
The combination of intra-elite rent-seeking struggle and demand for reform by the 
citizenry can ignite social and political conflict, thus undermining economic performance. 
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To summarize, corruption adversely affects growth through the many determinants of 
economic performance.  High corruption will therefore be associated with mediocre 
economic performance.  In the following subsection we discuss how the effects of 
corruption fall disproportionately on the poor, thus deepening deprivation and worsening 
income inequality. 
 
4.2 Effects of corruption on growth, on the poor, and on inequality 
 
The evidence discussed thus far establishes unambiguously that corruption has adverse 
effects on the factors that promote growth.  In addition to inefficiency effects – causing 
lower growth for a given endowment in factors and technology –, corruption also has 
adverse distributional effects because it affects the poor disproportionately. This section 
discusses the various ways in which corruption has detrimental effects on the poor, with 
an emphasis on the following five important channels: the effects on the income of the 
poor; the effects through the quantity of pro-poor services; adverse effects of corruption-
induced macroeconomic imbalances; the effects through congestion in public service 
delivery; and the effects on the quality of public services.  Some quantitative evidence 
from the literature is discussed to illustrate these effects. 
 
(1) Corruption slows down growth of the income of the poor 
 
Corruption has an immediate effect on the poor because it depresses overall growth.  As 
the country’s overall income slows down, that of the poor is negatively affected as well.  
In fact, a slowdown in the economy is likely to affect disproportionately the poor more 
than the wealthier members of society, especially given that the poor have less diversified 
sources of income.  Conversely, empirical evidence shows that an improvement in GDP 
growth is associated with a relatively large increase in the growth rate of the income of 
the poorest segments of the population.  According to the study by Gupta, Davoodi, and 
Alonso-Terme (1998), a one percentage point increase in per capita GDP growth is 
associated with a 1.2 percent growth of the income of the 20 percent poorest (see also 
Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme 2002).   
 
In addition to the indirect effects of corruption through growth, the empirical literature 
also finds that corruption has a direct effect on the income of the poor.  Gupta, Davoodi, 
and Alonso-Terme (2002) show that a one standard deviation increase in the growth rate 
of corruption (corresponding to a deterioration of 0.78 percentage points of corruption in 
their sample) causes a decline in the growth rate of the income of the bottom 20 percent 
of the population by 1.6 to 4.7 percent per year. Gyimah-Brempong (2002) finds that 
higher corruption is associated with higher income inequality in African countries, which 
suggests that corruption hurts the poor more than the rich, or at least we can say for sure 
that corruption benefits the poor much less than the rich. 
 
Note that there is a possibility of a reverse causality in the relationship between 
corruption and inequality.  Higher income inequality causes greater imbalances in the 
distribution of power, which in turn fosters corruption among the powerful elites.  
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Corruption is thus perpetuated by the inability of the poor to mobilize politically against 
it. 
 
(2) Corruption deepens poverty by reducing pro-poor public expenditures 
 
Corruption increases poverty by reducing the volume of public expenditures that are 
inherently pro-poor such as education and health because of the bias towards 
expenditures that generate rent in the form of bribes and kickbacks.  A corrupt 
government tends to favor expenditures on new infrastructure (see Figure 5) and military 
equipment, which enjoy higher degrees of discretion.  The ability to secretly inflate the 
bill for high tech military equipment and the payoffs from doing so are much higher than, 
for example, those from manipulating the salaries of elementary school teachers.  In the 
case of military expenditures, both demand-side and supply-side factors enhance the pro-
military bias in the budget (Gupta, De Mello, and Sharan 2001).  From the supply side, 
the end of the cold war has added pressure on suppliers to compete for new markets in 
the developing world.  From the demand side, governments have monopoly in providing 
services and enjoy secrecy in military-related operations.  These factors increase the 
opportunities for corruption and cause a bias in the composition of public expenditures to 
the disadvantage of pro-poor social services.  Indeed as can be seen in Figures 7 and 8, 
cross-country data shows that high corruption is associated with low expenditures on 
public health and basic education.  As social expenditures decline, the poor are 
disproportionately affected given that they cannot afford to switch to privately provided 
services.  
 
Figure 7: Corruption and public health expenditures
 (n=125 countries)
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Figure 8: Corruption and primary education expenditures
 (n=79 countries)
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The effects of corruption on social service provision are quantitatively large.  Gupta, 
Davoodi, and Tiongson (2002) find that compared to countries with low corruption, those 
with high corruption have infant mortality rates that are twice as high and primary school 
drop out rates that are five times as high.  The study also shows that a rise in income has 
a lower effect on living standards in high corruption countries.  The income elasticity of 
child mortality, infant mortality, and low-weight birth babies in low-corruption countries 
is about twice higher than the elasticity in high-corruption countries (Gupta, Davoodi, 
and Tiongson 2002: 267).  The results suggest that corruption obstructs the transmission 
mechanisms that translate income gains at the national level into improvements in living 
standards at the household level. 
 
The key finding from the evidence from the literature and the results presented in Figures 
3-8 and Tables 2 and 3 is that corruption has both inefficiency and 
allocative/distributional effects.  Corruption affects GDP growth and the composition of 
government expenditures. Corruption reduces income, GDP growth, taxes, current 
expenditures, and social expenditures while it raises child mortality, capital expenditures, 
and military expenditures.  The estimated elasticities in Table 3 indicate that the effects 
of corruption are quantitatively large.  The largest effects are on growth and child 
mortality.  The worsening of the governance environment depresses economic growth 
and raises child mortality disproportionately.  The results constitute further justification 
for consistent efforts to curb corruption.  Without an improvement in governance and the 
institutional environment, any increase in development financing is likely to be 
squandered into wasteful projects or siphoned into private wealth.  In fact new resources 
may serve to deepen institutional decay rather than improving the living standards of the 
population. 
 
(3) Adverse effects of corruption-induced macroeconomic imbalances 
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Corruption causes macroeconomic imbalances that have adverse effects on the poor.  In 
addition to reducing tax revenue, corruption also raises discretionary expenditures, 
causing the deficit to increase.  Given that corruption is also associated with weak 
independence of the Central Bank, deficit financing will be met by seignorage, which 
creates inflation.  At the same time, corruption eventually discourages external financing 
while raising the demand for foreign exchange to finance discretionary imports.  The 
resulting depreciation of the national currency amplifies the inflationary pressures arising 
from monetization of the deficit. 
 
Inflation disproportionately hurts the poor and fixed-income households in general by 
eroding their purchasing power.  Moreover, by increasing uncertainty, inflation will 
discourage business expansion, which in turn discourages employment creation.  
Therefore, macroeconomic imbalances caused by corrupt management of government’s 
budget contribute to deepening poverty by eroding the purchasing power of the poor and 
by undermining employment creation in the private sector. 
 
(4) Corruption discourages demand and causes congestion in social services  
 
For a given level of publicly provided services, corruption causes low effective use of 
services.  Bureaucratic corruption creates delays in service delivery and shortages of 
services as a way of generating opportunities for bribes and through embezzlement of 
supplies.  Corruption thus creates artificial congestion and increases the effective costs of 
public services.  Given that the poor are least able to pay for these extra costs, they are 
excluded and further marginalized, which deepens poverty. 
 
The congestion effects of corruption on public service delivery have powerful policy 
implications.  The debate on strategies to improve living standards for the poor often 
emphasizes the need for higher funding for social services. However the foregoing 
analysis suggests that larger budgets may not necessarily achieve this goal without 
substantial improvement in transparency and accountability in procurement procedures 
and better monitoring of the behavior of public officials involved in public service 
delivery.  Effective audit mechanisms increase the value added of existing allocations 
while enhancing the marginal benefits from new investments in public services.  Without 
better monitoring mechanisms, higher funding will only enrich corrupt bureaucrats and 
politicians.   
 
Congestion in public services often results also from corrupt practices that prevent entry 
into the service sector.  Barriers to entry in the form of explicit laws or due to extortions 
contribute to perpetuating government’s monopoly in service delivery. The public 
becomes a captive victim of rent-seeking bureaucrats and the economy is caught in a 
vicious circle of corruption-congestion-corruption that perpetuates low service delivery 
and poor living standards. 
 
The functionalist view argues that corruption allows private agents to get around delays, 
shortages, and congestion in the public service sector by serving as “the grease for the 
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squeaky wheels of a rigid administration” (Kaufmann 1997: 116).‡‡  However, empirical 
evidence overwhelmingly proves that corruption is associated with a deterioration of the 
quality of services (Gupta, Davoodi, and Tiongson 2002).  As the quality of public 
services deteriorates, the poor who have nowhere else to turn to are disproportionately 
affected.   
 
Deterioration of public services deepens inequality and perpetuates poverty across 
generations.  As the quality of public education deteriorates, the children of the poor are 
denied the chances for upward social mobility and remain trapped into low standards of 
living.  Similarly, as public health care deteriorates, the poor suffer the most as they 
cannot afford private health care.  Vulnerability to diseases erodes the ability of the poor 
to access the labor market, which undermines their chances of overcoming poverty.  
Corruption thus perpetuates poverty by reducing the quantity and quality of public 
service delivery. 
 
(5) Corruption causes a capital intensity bias  
 
Another way in which corruption affects the poor is by inducing a bias in favor of capital 
in the production system.  In most tax systems, incentives for private sector promotion 
are often designed in terms of investment tax credit and tax holidays.  In order to benefit 
from these incentives, businesses will tend to hire more capital than labor.  A corrupt 
bureaucracy also encourages investment in capital because it generates a source for 
bribery as firms negotiate tax incentives.  This hurts the poor, especially the unskilled, by 
reducing incentives for employment creation.  Moreover, corporate tax evasion benefits 
the wealthy who own companies. The poor are thus penalized twice: corruption takes 
away opportunities for employment while eroding government revenues, which reduces 
public service provision.   
 
5. FIGHTING CORRUPTION AND ADVANCING PRO-POOR GROWTH IN 
AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
 
Eradicating corruption is a challenging task, especially because it is a systemic 
phenomenon that exhibits a strong tendency for hysterisis.  Countries that are corrupt 
tend to remain corrupt for a long time.  While those who benefit from corruption have 
incentives to perpetuate it, the victims of corruption learn to cope with it so that 
corruption becomes expected and self-perpetuating.  Therefore, strategies are necessary 
to change the incentive structure by modifying the payoffs and sanctions that govern the 
interactions between bureaucrats and economic operators.  This section explores some 
strategies that have been proposed in the literature and discusses their promises as well as 
their limitations in the context of African countries. 
 
(1) Deterrence in a non-Weberian state: a paradox 
 
                                                 
‡‡ For detailed exposition of the functionalist view, see include Lui (1985) and Flatters and MacLeod 
(1995). 
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Debates over strategies for fighting corruption in Africa must confront the fact that from 
an individual perspective, corruption does not arise from behavioral pathology; it is 
consistent with rational behavior.  Corrupt bureaucrats maximize their own individual 
interests given the constraints associated with the institutional environment.  Therefore, 
the focus must be on finding the appropriate technology to detect, punish, and deter 
dishonest practices in bureaucracies.  The other fact that must be confronted is that 
monitoring is imperfect.  One way to overcome these challenges is to set penalties that 
are high enough to deter corrupt practices. 
 
However, resorting to stiff penalties as a means of deterring corruption confronts one 
paradox: as penalties increase, while the incidence of corruption may decrease, the 
amount of takings (bribes, kickbacks) may actually increase.  The reason is that as 
bureaucrats expect higher penalties, they will demand higher payments as compensation 
for the risk of being caught in corrupt deals.  The bribers also will offer higher payments 
to entice bureaucrats to engage in corrupt deals.  This relationship is illustrated in Figure 
9. 
 
The relationship in Figure 9 implies that the optimal strategy for fighting corruption 
depends on whether the objective is to minimize detection or minimize the takings.  From 
the government’s perspective, the choice will depend on whether the takings are a cost to 
the government or not.  To illustrate, consider two cases: bribery in driver’s license 
issuance and kickbacks on government projects.  Bribes paid to obtain a driver’s license 
(to get it faster) do not constitute a monetary loss to the government given that the 
applicant pays the bribe in addition to the official fee.  However, extortion in this case 
creates inefficiencies in the system and corruption in the driver’s license services may 
contaminate other public services.  So the government’s best response in this case is to 
set the stiffest penalties to reduce the incidence of corruption.  In contrast, the takings 
from government contracts in the form of kickbacks constitute a monetary loss to the 
government.  As bureaucrats and private suppliers collude to inflate the cost of projects, 
government expenses will increase.  In this case, raising penalties alone may actually 
increase the cost of corruption to the government and society.  The best strategy involves 
a combination of penalties and investment in detection technology.  Systematic audits of 
the procurement system may help in detecting dishonest practices.   
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Moreover, both parties to corrupt dealing must be punished to deter corruption.  While it 
is essential to send a clear message that no form or level of corruption will be tolerated, it 
is also vitally important to emphasize that no one is above the law or immune to penalty 
against dishonesty.  In fact, punishing top officials in an exemplary manner – or “frying 
the big fish” – is indispensable to an effective anti-corruption strategy (Klitgaard 1988; 
UNDP 1997).  However, holding top ranking government officials accountable requires 
an independent judiciary system.  Therefore, a prerequisite for preventing corruption in 
Africa is democratic governance and the enforcement of mechanisms that limit the power 
of the executive branch of the government. 
 
(2) Civil service wages: incentives and worker’s horizon 
 
The assertion that corruption serves as an incentive bonus because of low wages in the 
public sector cannot be dismissed easily.  The fact is that public sector wages in Africa 
are very low both in absolute and relative terms.  In the post-independence period, the 
public sector offered the most attractive jobs; wages were higher than in the private 
sector, and other non-wage advantages gave an absolute advantage to the public sector 
(UNDP 1997).  However, over time these advantages have eroded as civil service wages 
stagnated in nominal terms and eroded in real value. 
 
Declining wages force civil servants to seek for ways to supplement their income, 
including commercialization of public services.  For example, under the corrupt reign of 
Mobutu of former Zaïre, official salaries of civil servants accounted for only one third of 
the incomes of government officials (MacGaffey 1991: 14).  In this context, employment 
becomes important not for the income it brings but because it allows access to “profitable 
opportunities of a parallel commercial system in the heart of the state” (MacGaffey 1991: 
15).   
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Raising wages is necessary not just to fight corruption but first and foremost to allow 
ouseholds to afford a decent life.  However, raising wages alone will not prevent 
ategy to inducing honest behavior among civil servants is to extend their 
ptimization horizons through progressive compensation schemes.  Pay schemes that 
s the constraint of affordability for the 
overnment.  While empirical studies find that higher wages tend to reduce corruption, 
g the state as Gary Becker suggests.  It 
stead requires making the state more effective while preventing abuse of power by 
ot new in African countries.  At independence, new 
aders vowed to enforce honesty in public service.  Even Mobutu, the former dictator of 
 
h
corruption.  After all, the highest paid government officials are often also the most 
corrupt.  The objective of reforms must be to achieve a more equitable distribution of 
wages within the bureaucracy and a competitive wage relative to the private sector.  This 
will not only reduce corruption but will also increase productivity of labor in the public 
sector. 
 
One str
o
provide for substantially higher advantages in the future ultimately raise the cost of being 
fired while increasing the benefits from staying in good standing in the job.  Mechanisms 
for extending the worker’s horizon include healthy retirement packages and enforcement 
of promotion processes based on merit and seniority.  Low expected future compensation, 
meager retirement packages and patronage-based promotion induce workers to strongly 
prefer immediate gains, including corruption. 
 
Raising wages to alleviate corruption face
g
they also indicate that the rates of increase in wages necessary to bring down corruption 
substantially are high and cannot be covered within the limits of the budget (Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder 2001).  Wage hikes therefore need to be combined with other 
incentives to deter corruption, including a range of institutional reforms through 
establishment of agencies of restraint to limit the discretionary powers of bureaucrats.   
 
(3) Agencies of restraint for fighting corruption 
 
Abolishing corruption does not require abolishin
in
bureaucrats.  This requires establishing institutions that serve as agencies of restraint by 
limiting the power of the state.   
 
Efforts to fight corruption are n
le
Zaïre who turned out to be one of the most corrupt leaders on the planet, had vowed to 
live off his salary as a civil servant when he took power in 1965 (Ndikumana and Boyce 
1998).  Anti-corruption courts, commissions for audit of assets of government officials 
and other watch dog institutions have been setup in may countries, but these efforts have 
often produced little effect on fighting corruption.  For anti-corruption courts to be 
effective there needs to be a clear separation of power between the judiciary and the 
executive branches of government.  Courts cannot work efficiently when they are 
constantly obstructed by top officials of the executive branch of government.  Given that 
corruption often involves a web of relations including top government officials, it is 
impossible to prosecute it unless the judiciary is truly independent.   
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Establishing anti-corruption agencies is not enough to root out corruption in African 
countries.  Often these agencies have been used to harass leaders of the opposition and 
ctivists in civil society instead of fighting corruption.  Where such institutions have 
 
rves to break the tradition of secrecy by increasing citizen access to information.  The 
s of 
dependence heroes will include those who will successfully lead the struggle against 
a
succeeded, a range of other reforms have been implemented simultaneously to support 
new institutions.  Hong Kong and Singapore are the most cited examples of successful 
institutional engineering to fight corruption (Klitgaard 1988; UNDP 1997).  The 
Singaporean case is often cited as evidence of the role of higher public wages in reducing 
corruption.  However, in addition to higher wages, other mechanisms were also put in 
place to increase monitoring and to reduce opportunities for corruption.  These included 
the rotation of bureaucrats to prevent the development of client-bureaucrat corrupt ties, 
streamlining, simplification and publication of rules and procedures in government 
services and contracts, reduction and removal of a range of permits and fees for public 
services.  But most importantly, the case of Singapore was successful thanks to strong 
commitment by the top leadership to reforming the bureaucracy and fighting corruption. 
 
Another institutional tool for fighting corruption is to increase public disclosure of 
information on funding and management of government programs and projects. This
se
case of Uganda has been cited as a successful experiment in fighting corruption through 
information disclosure.  The elementary and secondary school system in Uganda had 
been plagued by misuse of government funds, a substantial fraction of which evaporated 
on their way from the central administration to local districts.  The government decided 
to publish the transfers of grants to districts in local newspapers and even on bill boards, 
thus allowing parents and school staff to monitor the funds.  The information disclosure 
campaign was instrumental in increasing the fraction of funds that reached the final users 
(Reinikka and Svensson 2005, 2004).  The campaign was an innovative strategy to 
increase transparency in public funds management and citizen’s voice.  These grass-root 
information and empowerment mechanisms have been initiated with varying degrees of 
success in other countries such as India and Brazil (Svensson 2005).  These experiences 
show that institutional innovations have potentially high returns to fighting corruption in 
Africa.  The lesson is that the fight against corruption requires a concerted effort that 
involves initiatives at the grass-roots level aimed at increasing citizen participation. 
 
Fighting corruption will require first and foremost strong and determined national 
leadership.  The next generation of African leaders to follow in the footstep
in
the modern era enemy of the African nation, which is corruption.  This struggle will 
require as much bravery as the struggle for independence because it will also encounter 
stiff resistance from those who benefit from institutional decay.  Just as the colonizers 
never wanted to let go of their grip onto the African nation, today’s corrupt leaders and 
their domestic and international cronies will do all they can to sabotage plans for 
reforming the bureaucracy.   
 
(4) The fight against capital flight 
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The fight against capital flight involves strategies to prevent new illicit capital outflows 
nd to repatriate stolen funds held abroad.  Preventing capital flight requires enforcement 
ing borrowed money.  While these assets benefit their 
t the 
ts.  The first strategy is for debtor countries to repudiate these 
to distinguish between 
a
of rules of transparency and accountability in the management of government funds.  In 
addition, controls on private capital outflows can serve as a deterrent to capital smuggling 
by private actors.  Repatriating stolen assets will be a challenging task.  These assets will 
not be enticed to return by improvements in the domestic investment climate given that 
low returns to capital are not the primary motive for exporting capital in the first place.  
For these assets, African countries will have to use coercive legal claims, asserting that 
the people of Africa have a moral and legal right to recover these assets.  The main 
problem is that such assets are generally carefully concealed with the cooperation of 
Western banks and individuals.   
Illicit assets held abroad by Africans are to a large extent the product of the theft and 
smuggling of public funds, includ
private individual owners, corresponding liabilities – the debts that financed them – fall 
on the shoulders of the debtor countries’ populations.  Efforts to recover and repatriate 
illicit private fortunes are one way by which African peoples and their governments can 
attempt to repair the disjuncture between public external debts and private external assets.  
This is a difficult route, however, since it places the burden of proof squarely on the 
African governments to locate and reclaim the money (see, for example, The Financial 
Times, 2000).  An alternative strategy would be for African countries to repudiate the 
debts that financed these private assets on the ground that these debts are “odious”.   
 
A country’s debts are considered “odious” if three conditions hold (see Ndikumana and 
oyce 1998; Kremer and Jayachandran 2002): (1) the debts were incurred withouB
consent of the people; that is, they were borrowed by an undemocratic regime; (2) the 
borrowed funds were used not for the benefit of the people, but instead for the interests of 
the rulers, possibly including for repression against the same people that these funds were 
nominally intended to help; (3) creditors were aware or should have been aware of 
conditions (1) and (2.   
 
The literature on odious debts has outlined two main strategies with regard to the 
reatment of odious debt
debts unilaterally.  This ex post strategy is described in Boyce and Ndikumana (2001, 
2005).  In the second strategy, odious debts are defined as loans issued to a government 
that has been designated as “odious” ex ante by an international institution.  Under this 
scenario, governments can repudiate those debts incurred after the “odious government” 
status has been established and made public by the appropriate international institution.  
This strategy is advocated by Kremer and Jayachandran (2002).   
 
The logic behind the argument for ex post repudiation of odious debt is that just as in the 
ase of private assets held abroad by Africans, it is difficult c
legitimate debts and odious debts.  Putting the burden of proof on the shoulders of debtor 
countries to establish the “odious” nature of debts in many cases could impose 
insuperable transaction costs.  An alternative approach would be to put the burden of 
proof on the creditors to demonstrate the legitimacy of the debts contracted by previous 
dictatorial regimes.  African governments would inform their creditors that outstanding 
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debts will be treated as legitimate if, and only if, the real counterparts of the debts can be 
identified.  If the creditors can document how the loans were used and demonstrate that 
they benefited citizens of the African country via investment or consumption, then the 
debts would be regarded as a bona fide external obligation of the government.  But if the 
fate of the borrowed money cannot be traced, then the present African governments must 
infer that it was diverted into capital flight, and hence the liability for the debt lies not 
with the current government, but with the private individuals whose personal fortunes are 
the real counterpart of the debt.   
 
In adopting such a strategy of repudiation of odious debts, Africans could invoke as a 
recedent the US government’s stance a century ago toward the creditors of the erstwhile 
 to Africa’s external assets and 
abilities.  On both sides of the balance sheet, the burden of proof in realizing the face 
trategy advocated by Kremer and 
yachandran (2002), an international referee declares a regime as odious or not 
te repudiation approach has several weaknesses as a strategy for addressing the 
roblems of odious debt and capital flight.  First and foremost, the strategy leaves the 
                                                
p
Spanish colonial regime in Cuba after the Spanish-American war:  the creditors knew, or 
should have known, the risks they faced when they made the loans to the predecessor 
regime, and they “took the chances of the investment.”§§  
 
In effect, this strategy would accord symmetric treatment
li
value of external claims would lie with the creditors:  African governments seeking to 
reclaim flight capital, and banks and creditor governments seeking to collect debt-service 
payments.  The case for symmetry is reinforced by the past complicity of African 
countries’ external creditors in sustaining the power of corrupt rulers and in helping them 
to spirit their ill-gotten gains abroad.  As The Financial Times (2000) remarks, in an 
editorial comment on the freezing of General Abacha’s Swiss bank accounts, “Financial 
institutions that knowingly channeled the funds have much to answer for, acting not so 
much as bankers but as bagmen, complicit in the corruption that has crippled Nigeria.”  
Capital flight from Nigeria under the Abacha regime was simply an egregious example of 
a more widespread phenomenon in the continent.  
 
Under the alternative ex ante repudiation s
Ja
legitimate.  Lenders may issue loans to an odious government, but they do so at their own 
risk.  Successor governments not only can repudiate any such loans, but in fact are 
required to repudiate all debts subsequently issued to the odious government, so as to 
prevent new loans and aid from being squandered on servicing odious debts.  Kremer and 
Jayachandran (2002) claim that if the referee indeed assesses the legitimacy of the 
government truthfully and creditors act rationally, no or little odious debt will be issued 
in the market.  They also argue that this mechanism is superior to the conventional 
economic sanctions as it is less likely to affect adversely the population in the debtor 
country. 
 
The ex an
p
burden of past debts, a large portion of which may be odious, on the shoulders of the 
population of the debtor country.  On its own, this strategy would leave African countries 
trapped in the current debt crisis that resulted in large part from irresponsible borrowing 
 
§§  For discussion, see Hoeflich (1982) and Ndikumana and Boyce (1998). 
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by past regimes and complacent lending by Western financiers.  The strategy therefore 
lets both beneficiary parties (past corrupt governments and their financiers) off the hook 
at no cost.   
 
Second, this approach may increase the risk of moral hazard in the debt market.  Myopic 
lers may borrow excessively if they have the green light to access external debt and if 
l international institution that will 
ssess “truthfully” the nature of existing governments.  Western governments, 
ets in the West is the nature of 
anking practices in the international financial centers, which typically are characterized 
                                                
ru
lenders have been assured that their loans are safe from being regarded as odious debts.  
Non-odious regimes may also divert some borrowing to private pockets and adopt 
economic policies that not only affect the ability to repay the loans but also raise the issue 
of the responsibility of the population at large. 
 
Third, it is difficult to find a competent and impartia
a
multilateral institutions, and non-governmental organizations often have specific political 
interests in supporting client regimes, regardless of whether these regimes are democratic 
or not.  Influential governments may paralyze the functioning of the referee institution by 
exercising their veto power when a ruling is likely to go against a client regime or when 
they want to enforce a particular outcome for a disfavored regime.  In addition to obvious 
political interests, bias may arise in favor of economically powerful countries.  For 
instance, any institution will hesitate to classify the government of a country like China 
or India as odious, given their importance in the international political and economic 
arena.  In contrast, smaller countries, especially African countries, are likely to be 
disproportionately rationed out of the debt market.  Consequently, such a strategy could 
increase the marginalization of the African continent.   
 
A major obstacle to accessing illegally acquired ass
b
by secrecy, justified by the bankers in the name of the customer’s privacy.  The Swiss 
banking system, in particular, became the attraction pole for many clients thanks to its 
zealous enforcement of these privacy privileges.  In fact, Swiss bankers consider these as 
more than just privileges.  Mr. Hans Peter Brunner, the Chief Executive of Coutts, 
Switzerland, put it as follows (Watts, 2002): “To us privacy in one’s banking is a human 
right… It is an integral part of our constitution.”  This practice implies asymmetry in the 
treatment of domestically held assets and assets held abroad, by shielding the latter from 
public scrutiny while the former are more open to public prosecution in the event of a 
legal investigation.  African countries will have limited success in tracing assets held 
abroad until the international banking practices are reformed towards higher transparency 
and accountability.  Ideally, African governments should have access to the information 
on banking operations by their nationals in foreign banks.  This will not only allow 
African governments to track down tax dodging but also money laundering and fraud.***   
 
 
*** More transparency will also serve as a means of tracking down the financing of terrorist activities.  One 
would expect that this should attract support from all governments in the North as well as the South.  It 
remains to be seen whether “national interests” will outweigh the financial interests of private bankers and 
their privileged clientele. 
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Preferential tax treatment of foreign-owned assets in the West constitutes another 
frican governments acting alone will have little chance of bringing about these changes 
) Democratic consolidation and the role of the media 
he fight against corruption should be considered as an integral part of the agenda for 
ne indispensable tool for fighting corruption is the development and protection of a free 
) Publish what you pay; Declare what you own 
fforts to fight against corruption must include strategies to break the circles of 
constraint for asset repatriation.  For example, the withholding tax charged on foreign 
investors in the Swiss banking system is well below the tax rates on savings in EU 
countries, and this has been a major cause of contention between EU members and 
Switzerland (Watts, 2002).  African asset holders enjoy a similar preferential tax 
treatment, which constitutes an important loss for the tax authority.  Two important 
changes are warranted in this regard.  First, Western banks should systematically 
withhold taxes on assets held by African customers.  This would circumvent the problem 
of tax evasion by asset holders.  Second, mechanisms should be established for the 
transfer of these taxes to the asset holder’s country of origin.  Today’s information 
technology can allow automatic transmission of information on non-resident bank 
customers to the relevant tax authorities in the home countries.  Obviously the issue is not 
that of technical capacity but political will. 
 
A
in the banking system.  They will need support from the donor community, including 
Western governments, and international financial institutions (the IMF and the World 
Bank).   
 
(5
 
T
consolidation of democratic governance in African countries.  Institutional reform should 
aim at establishing a culture of accountability and transparency in the management of 
public resources. 
 
O
and truly independent media.  Obstruction of free press suffocates public demand for 
political participation and perpetuates lack of transparency in the public sphere.  For 
African countries to have a chance of significantly reducing corruption, it is essential to 
enforce freedom of expression and to elevate it to its legitimate status of fundamental 
human right. 
 
(6
 
E
complicity between African government officials and international corporations.  These 
strategies include enforcement of accountability and full disclosure of information about 
business practices by foreign companies as well as full disclosure of information on the 
wealth of government officials.  It is vital that the international community concentrate 
efforts to enforce the “Publish What You Pay” rules that require international companies 
to disclose all payments related to their business operations, including non-price fees.  
Failure to fully disclose all the payments should be prosecuted in the courts of the 
company’s country of origin as well as the host country in Africa.  Top African 
government officials in turn should be required to declare periodically the origin of all 
their wealth and such declarations should be accessible to the public in national 
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languages through local media.  This will eventually dissuade some of the corruption 
although there will always be some clever thieves that will find ways of evading the 
scrutiny of the public eye.  The key is to enforce symmetry in the treatment and 
punishment of corruption by local agents and corruption by their international 
counterparts. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
he evidence discussed in this paper suggests that the effects of corruption are quite 
orrupt bureaucracies are unable and unwilling to target growth policies toward poverty 
he national and international initiatives to fight corruption in African countries must pay 
eferences 
cemoglu, D. and T. Verdier, 2000. “The choice between market failure and corruption.” 
Akerlo ypothesis and unemployment.” 
Alatas, Nature, Function, Causes and 
Prevention of Corruption. Singapore: Hoong Fatt Press. 
 
T
large.  The evidence suggests that corruption affects the poor disproportionately by 
reducing growth and income.  These effects of corruption on the poor arise notably from 
the bias against social expenditures that corruption induces in the allocation of the 
budget.  For a given level of government budget and national income, high corruption 
countries achieve lower literacy rates, have higher mortality rates and overall worse 
human development scores.  Therefore, while it is essential to raise public funding for 
pro-poor social services, the marginal returns to higher spending will remain low so long 
as corruption continues to plague African bureaucracies.   
 
C
alleviation.  Therefore, international efforts to eradicate poverty must include fighting 
corruption as a central part of development assistance policy.  The international 
community must be ready to get its hands dirty by forcing governments to undertake 
serious reforms towards more transparency, accountability and citizen participation in the 
management of public funds and programs.  Public disclosure of information constitutes 
an essential instrument for breaking the tradition of secrecy and discretion in the 
management of public accounts. The international community should provide vital 
assistance in streamlining, simplifying, and modernizing regulations and procedures in 
various government services to reduce the opportunities and temptation for corruption.   
 
T
serious attention to international corruption involving government officials and their 
cronies in multinational companies as well as their western bankers.  Embezzlement of 
revenues from natural resources and the smuggling of borrowed money and aid through 
capital flight continue to enrich national elites while impoverishing the large majority of 
the population.  Curbing such forms of corruption will require enforcement of 
transparency in international business and banking practices, which necessitates 
cooperation between African countries and their western counterparts.   
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Table 1: Corruption, capital flight, debt burden, and social expenditures and development 
Country SIC/HIPC 
2001-03 
KF stock 
1996 
KF/GDP 
1996 
debt/gdp 
1996 
tds/gdp 
2003 
educ/gdp 
2000-02 
health/gdp 
2002 
HDI 
rank/177, 
2005 
corruption 
rank/158, 
2005 
corruption 
score/10 
Angola  SIC & HIPC 20405.0 267.8 147.3 10.3 2.8 2.1 160 151 2.0
Benin  MIC & HIPC -6003.8 -271.9 72.2 1.7 3.3 2.1 162 88 2.9
Burkina Faso  MIC & HIPC 1896.6 96.5 60.9 1.2 2.4* 2.0 175 70 3.4
Burundi  SIC & HIPC 980.9 108.9 125.2 4.9 3.9 0.6 169 130 2.3
Cameroon  MIC & HIPC 16906.0 185.6 104.8 3.6 3.8 1.2 148 137 2.2
Central African Rep  SIC & HIPC 459.0 50.8 104.1 0.1 2.2* 1.6 171 na na
Congo, DRC SIC & HIPC 19199.9 327.1 218.5 2.6 na 1.1 167 144 2.1
Congo, Rep SIC & HIPC 1254.0 49.6 207.4 0.9 3.2 1.5 142 130 2.3
Côte D’Ivoire  SIC & HIPC 34745.5 324.7 182.5 4.2 4.6 1.4 162 152 1.9
Ethiopia  MIC & HIPC 8017.9 133.4 167.7 1.4 4.6 2.6 170 137 2.2
Gabon  SIC & HIPC 5028.1 87.0 74.6 6.2 3.9 1.8 123 88 2.9
Ghana  LIC & HIPC 289.3 4.2 93.0 6.3 3.2* 2.3 138 65 3.5
Guinea  SIC & HIPC 434.2 11.0 81.8 3.6 1.8 0.9 156 na na
Kenya  MIC & HIPC 2472.6 26.8 75.2 4.0 7.0 2.2 154 144 2.1
Madagascar  MIC & HIPC 1577.5 39.5 103.8 1.3 2.9 1.2 146 97 2.8
Malawi  SIC & HIPC 1174.8 93.8 171.3 2.1 6.0 4.0 165 97 2.8
Mali  LIC & HIPC -1527.2 -57.5 113.3 1.8 na 2.3 174 88 2.9
Mauritania  MIC & HIPC 1830.0 167.4 219.9 5.0 na 2.9 152 na na
Mauritius  MIC & HIPC 465.9 10.8 42.3 4.5 4.7 2.2 65 51 4.2
Mozambique  LIC & HIPC 6206.9 218.4 266.3 2.0 na 4.1 168 97 2.8
Niger  MIC & HIPC -4768.9 -247.7 84.3 1.2 2.3 2.0 177 126 2.4
Nigeria  MIC & HIPC 129661.0 367.3 89.0 2.8 0.9* 1.2 158 152 1.9
Rwanda  SIC & HIPC 3513.9 249.9 74.2 1.3 2.8 3.1 159 83 3.1
Senegal  LIC & HIPC -9998.2 -214.9 78.7 3.8 3.6 2.3 157 78 3.2
Sierra Leone  SIC & HIPC 2277.8 257.1 136.0 3.2 3.7 1.7 176 126 2.4
Sudan  SIC & HIPC 11613.7 161.1 235.5 0.2 6* 1.0 141 144 2.1
Togo  SIC & HIPC -1618.3 -155.4 147.0 0.9 2.6 5.1 143 na na
Uganda  MIC & HIPC 3316.1 54.8 60.7 1.3 1.5* 2.1 144 117 2.5
Zambia  SIC & HIPC 13131.2 354.9 206.5 9.0 2.0 3.1 166 107 2.6
Zimbabwe  SIC & HIPC 10882.9 149.0 65.8 0.0 4.7 4.4 145 107 2.6
* Education expenditure/gdp = 1990 value (latest value missing).  
SIC, MIC, LIC = Severely, middle, least indebted country; HIPC = highly indebted poor country;  
KF = capital flight; educ/gdp = education expenditures/GDP; HDI = human development index (rank out of 177 countries); corruption rank/158: country ranking 
in corruption perception out of 158 countries. 
Sources: capital flight and debt ratios: Ndikumana and Boyce (2003); expenditures and development: UNDP Human Development Report 2005; Corruption: 
Transparency International. 
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Table 2: Correlation between performance indicators and corruption and other risk/governance indicators 
 
Indicator Statistic  Corruption Lack of rule of law Bureaucratic inefficiency Composite risk 
Correlation -0.686* -0.764* -0.752* -0.806* GDP per capita  
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
correlation -0.313* -0.377* -0.369* -0.445* Growth per capita (%) 
N=125 p-value 0.0004 0.000 0.000 0.000 
correlation -0.176 -0.207 -0.268* -0.3454* Domestic investment (% of GDP) 
N=123 p-value 0.051 0.021 0.002 0.0001 
correlation -0.579* -0.585* -0.539* -0.573* Tax revenue (% of GDP) 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
correlation -0.466* -0.432* -0.376* -0.413* Current expenditures (% of GDP) 
N=90 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.0003 0.0001 
correlation 0.305* 0.238 0.259 0.210 Capital expenditures (% of GDP) 
N=90 p-value 0.003 0.023 0.013 0.046 
correlation 0.399* 0.330* 0.294 0.328* Military expenditures (% of government expenditures) 
N=70 p-value 0.0006 0.005 0.013 0.005 
correlation -0.432* -0.403* -0.335* -0.301* Primary education expenditures per student (% of per capita GDP)
N=79 p-value 0.0001 0.0002 0.002 0.007 
correlation -0.656* -0.627* -0.601* -0.616* Public health expenditures (% of GDP) 
N=125 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
correlation -0.532* -0.599* -0.589* -0.682* Life expectancy 
N=128 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
correlation 0.492* 0.584* 0.583* 0.680* Under-5 child mortality (per thousand live births) 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
correlation 0.564* 0.464* 0.481* 0.514* Gini index 
N=55 p-value 0.000 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001 
Note: a * indicate correlation coefficient significant at 1% level. 
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Table 3: Partial effects of corruption on policy and performance indicators: OLS coefficients and implied elasticities 
 
Indicator  Corruption Lack or rule of law Bureaucratic inefficiency Composite risk  
 Coefficient 
(t stat) 
elasticity R2 
(obs) 
Coefficient 
(t stat) 
elasticity R2 
(obs) 
Coefficient 
(t stat) 
elasticity R2 
(obs) 
Coefficient 
(t stat) 
elasticity R2 
(obs) 
Ln (GDP 
per capita) 
-0.776 
(-9.90) 
-0.36 0.42 
(120)
-0.859
(-12.25)
-0.38 0.54
(120)
-1.1076
(-12.9)
-0.67 -0.58
(120)
-0.107
(-15.04)
-0.52 0.71 
(120) 
Growth per 
capita 
-0.390 
(-3.16) 
-1.45 0.23 
(122)
-0.394
(-2.75)
-1.33 0.27
(122)
-0.359
(-1.93)
-1.75 0.26
(122)
-0.036
(-1.94)
-1.36 0.26 
(122) 
Current 
expenditure  
-3.400 
(-2.95) 
-0.46 0.25 
(90)
-2.937
(-2.67)
-0.37 0.23
(90)
-2.597
(-1.96)
-0.47 0.19
(90)
-0.318
(-2.68)
-0.43 0.21 
(90) 
Capital 
expenditure  
0.613 
(1.81) 
0.50 0.12 
(90)
0.379
(1.28)
0 0.09
(90)
0.564
(1.24)
0 0.10
(90)
0.030
(0.86)
0 0.08 
(90) 
Military 
expenditure  
3.377 
(3.19) 
0.93 0.16 
(70)
2.494
(3.56)
0.64 0.11
(70)
2.423
(2.73)
0.91 0.09
(70)
0.289
(3.68)
0.81 0.12 
(70) 
Primary 
education 
expenditure  
-2.777 
(-3.85) 
-0.62 0.20 
(79)
-2.397
(-3.30)
-0.50 0.17
(79)
-2.117
(-2.76)
-0.64 0.11
(79)
-0.179
(-1.67)
-0.41 0.09 
(79) 
Public 
health 
expenditure  
-0.757 
(-6.81) 
-0.81 0.52 
(122)
-0.657
(-5.09)
-0.65 0.48
(122)
-0.707
(-5.13)
-1.01 0.45
(122)
-0.065
(-4.66)
-0.72 0.45 
(122) 
Tax 
revenue  
-3.594 
(-4.33) 
-0.59 0.35 
(90)
-3.572
(-4.59)
-0.55 0.35
(90)
-3.628
(-3.98)
-0.81 0.30
(90)
-0.414
(-4.33)
-0.69 0.34 
(90) 
Under-5 
child 
mortality  
22.560 
(7.52) 
1.31 0.29 
(121)
25.523
(7.59)
1.40 0.35
(121)
30.46
(7.52)
2.35 0.36
(121)
3.119
(9.33)
1.88 0.47 
(121) 
 
Note 1: The table reports coefficients and implied elasticities from OLS regressions of the indicators in the first column (as dependent variables) 
alternatively on corruption, lack of rule of law, bureaucratic inefficiency, and a composite index of risk.  The figures in parenthesis are t statistics.  
For growth, the regression includes domestic investment as control variable.  For the other indicators, the controls are growth per capita and life 
expectancy.  However, for child mortality rate, only growth per capita is included (due to collinearity between child mortality and life expectancy).   
Note 2: A coefficient of elasticity of 0 indicates that the coefficient and the implied elasticity are not significant. 
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Appendix Table A1: Corruption, risk, and economic performance indicators for SSA and other regions, averages 1984-1999. 
 
 Sub-Saharan Africa Latin America and Caribbean Sample 
Corruption and risk indicators Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean
Corruption (0 to 7) 33 4.3 25 4.3 128 3.7
Lack of rule of law (0 to 7) 33 4.3 25 4.1 128 3.4
Lack of democratic accountability (0 to 7) 33 4.4 25 3.6 128 3.5
Bureau inefficiency (0 to 7) 33 5.5 25 5.5 128 4.9
Economic risk (0 to 50) 33 22.3 25 20.8 128 18.3
Financial risk (0 to 50) 33 25.0 25 20.8 128 18.5
Political risk (0 to 100) 33 49.6 25 41.7 128 39.2
Composite risk (0 to 100) 33 48.3 25 41.6 128 37.9
Policy and performance indicators 
Per Capita GDP (constant 2000 $) 32 681.8 24 3214.6 120 6421.4
per cap GDP Growth (%) 33 -0.1 25 1.0 125 1.0
Domestic investment (% of GDP) 32 17.6 25 19.0 123 20.8
Current expenditure (% of GDP) 20 20.5 21 22.7 90 25.8
Capital expenditure (% of GDP) 20 5.4 21 3.7 90 4.2
Military expenditure (% of government expenditures) 15 13.9 10 7.3 70 12.3
Primary education expenditure per student (% of per capita GDP) 16 14.6 18 12.5 79 15.1
Public health expenditure  (% of GDP) 33 2.2 25 3.5 125 3.4
Tax revenue (% of GDP) 20 16.5 21 17.8 90 20.9
Life expectancy at birth (years) 33 50.0 25 70.1 128 66.0
Under-5 child mortality (per thousand live births) 31 152.3 25 39.6 124 62.7
Gini index 19 49.3 7 48.3 55 41.6
 
Sources:  
- corruption and risk indicators are from International Country Risk. The variables are transformed so that a higher value indicates a worse situation. 
- policy and performance indicators are from World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2005 and IMF’s Government Financial Statistics. 
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